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Abstract—Major standardization bodies developed and designed
systems that should be used in vehicular ad-hoc networks.
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in
America designed the wireless access in vehicular environments
(WAVE) system. The European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI) did come up with the “ITS-G5” system. Those
Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) are the basis for Intelligent
Transportation Systems (ITSs). They aim to efficiently commu-
nicate and provide benefits to people, ranging from improved
safety to convenience. But different design and architectural
choices lead to different network properties, especially security
properties that are fundamentally depending on the networks
architecture. To be able to compare different security architec-
tures, different proposed approaches need to be discussed. One
problem in current research is the missing focus on different
approaches for trust establishment in VANETs. Therefore, this
paper surveys different security issues and solutions in VANETs
and we furthermore categorize these solutions into three basic
trust defining architectures: centralized, decentralized and hybrid.
These categories represent how trust is build in a system, i.e.,
in a centralized, decentralized way or even by combining both
opposing approaches to a hybrid solution, which aims to inherit
the benefits of both worlds. This survey defines those categories
and finds that hybrid approaches are underrepresented in current
research efforts.
Keywords–security; security issues; security architectures;
VANET; MANET; ITS.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper surveys different security architecture tech-
niques for VANETs used in ITSs. Security plays a significant
role in modern Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs), which include
intelligent transport systems. Trust establishment describes
how trust is formed, which in return defines the fundamental
security architecture of a system. The future of ITS is a net-
worked one where vehicles and infrastructure do communicate
to make traffic more efficient and safer. As vehicles are inher-
ently mobile and self containing, the only way to communicate
on the move is via wireless technology. Wireless has proven
over time that getting security right in wireless technology is
hard. An example of security done wrong is the utterly broken
WEP technology, which is an acronym for “Wire Equivalent
Privacy”, but it was never able to fulfill that promise. Not
only do security issues in regards to authentication exist
but furthermore there are also security issues, like denial of
service, replay or spoofing attacks, which vary in severity
and easy of exploitability. But overall security in wireless
technologies is boiling down to how trust is established and
which methods and algorithms are used to secure the trust
establishment.
One centralized approach for conveying trust is the mode
of operation that is used in telecommunication standards all
over the world, i.e., Global System for Mobile Communica-
tions (GSM), Code division multiple access (CDMA), Uni-
versal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) or Long-
Term Evolution (LTE). That mode of operation is building
trust based on a shared symmetric secret. Until recently the
weaknesses were discussed, like the important dependence
of secrecy of this shared secret, but arguments were often
discarded because of the needed effort to steal the secret
key of each customer and the high security approach network
operators supposedly are taking to secure those secrets. The
treasure trove of leaked information by former National Secu-
rity Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden, showed the
security community again once more how bad our assumptions
were in this regard. As documents provided by the online
publication THE INTERCEPT [1] show that American (NSA)
and British spy agencies Government Communications Head-
quarters (GCHQ) managed to steal those important secrets
directly from the manufacturer, in this case Gemalto. The
theft means, on a technical level, that authenticity and con-
fidentiality of a communication, supposedly secured by those
stolen secrets, is compromised. The methods supposedly used
to execute that theft raise many questions but this discussion
might fit better in a legal or social publication and should not
be discussed in this paper. Another rather recently uncovered
attack on several banks (ca. 100 banks) around the world (ca.
30 countries) where a so called “Carnbanak cybergang” have
stolen an estimated amount of 1 billion United States dollar
(USD). While the used malware does not appear to be of
very high sophistication, only the weakest trust relationship in
computing, between a human and a machine was exploited via
spear phishing, the orchestration, endurance and the targeted
approach of the attackers where extremely remarkable, as
reported by Kapersky Labs [2].
The underestimation, to what length state actors would go
to achieve informational advantage in combination with how
persistent and patient criminal actors are becoming, previously
only attributed to state actors, goes to show how wrong and
weak our current assumptions on cybersecurity have been. All
central approaches bear the risk of being exploited by targeted
attacks on the central trust anchors. And this is why we urge
every researcher to reevaluate their assumptions and seek for
alternative designs. Both currently developed major standards,
IEEE WAVE [3] or ETSI ITS-G5 [4], favor a centralized
security architecture, with trust rooting in central authorities,
which represent a high value target for attackers to exploit.
Decentralized approaches could be such an alternative, by
making such attacks much more risky and costly due to the
distribution of trust relations. Distributed trust relations have
their own issues, like performance or new attack opportunities
not present in centralized architectures. Therefore, the combi-
nation of both architectural approaches, in this paper called
hybrid approaches, could pose a overall security improve-
ment, especially in the current environment with increasing
proliferation of attack and exploitation techniques accessible
to criminals and state actors alike. Attacking seams to be
easier than defending, this is why we argue a easy to defend
security architecture is paramount for any information system
or network nowadays, especially in the field of ITSs, which
are in focus of this paper.
As stated previously trust establishment can be achieved
via a centralized way e.g., a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI),
decentralized e.g., a Web of Trust (WoT) or by using a
hybrid approach, which tries to combine the benefits of both
approaches. Security issues in mobile ad-hoc networks are used
to find solution for them and then categorizing those solutions
into their general security architecture. We limit ourselves
to some of the following major issues in ITS mentioned by
various researches like Hubaux et al.[5], Lin et al.[6] or in an
already summarized from by Yang [7].
• Impersonating by false, stole identities, Message
spoofing or replay attacks
• Tampering with data in-transit
• Send false feedback to silence other vehicles
• Sinkhole attack via false routing information to effec-
tively execute Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks
• Sybil attack by creating virtual sock puppet identities
to manipulate voting procedures to the attackers ben-
efit
• An eclipse attack is similar to an sybil attack it
specifically tries to split a network by using means
of a malicious group of nodes
• Manipulating the network topology and disturbing
node by connecting far away segments via a hidden
tunnel (wormhole attack)
• Privacy violation caused by continues communication
• Denial of Service (DoS) by jamming signals or over-
loading specific nodes
In [8], Agrawal et al. present a short overview of different
security issues and solutions with their objectives and draw
backs. Mishra et al. [9] display a wide array of research
effort in regards to security issues and solutions, which they
think are important. A detailed introduction into VANETs is
given by Raya et al. [10] they furthermore expand on, security
issues and solutions in VANETs. Zhang[11] categorizes trust
management for VANETs in three models: Entity-oriented
Trust Model, Data-oriented Trust Model and Combined Trust
Model. We differentiate various approaches to security issues
in VANETs into three categories: Centralized, Decentralized
and Hybrid as we think these categories describe the way trust
is build better.
We define those categories in detail in the following
Section II. Thereafter in separate sections we describe eight
different security issues, already defined by Yang [7]. Each of
these section contains solutions to its security issues, which
are categorized according to our definition into: Centralized,
Decentralized and Hybrid solutions. A summary of this paper
is provided in the last Section III.
II. ANALYSIS
One of the main issues in ad-hoc-communication is trust.
It is a basic problem in security to establish so-called trust
anchors. Several models for trust management exist. The
surveyed approaches with their assigned categories are listed
in the summary table I.
Centralized: A central trust model may for example be
implemented by a PKI. A PKI consists of one or more Certifi-
cate Authorities (CAs) that issue certificates to the participants
of the system. The issue of certification may be delegated to
Sub-CAs, resulting in a hierarchy of CAs. A certificate of a
participant is considered to be legitimate, if it is possible to
find a certification path from the certificate to a known and
trusted CA. Several (yet unknown) Sub-CAs may be on the
certificate path. Per se, all legitimate certificates are considered
trusted. Hence, all the known and trusted certificates represent
trust anchors for one participant. Using a PKI simplifies trust
establishment to secure setup of trust anchors on an instance
of the system.
Decentralized: A decentralized trust model may for ex-
ample be a so WoT. In a WoT scenario, each participant of
the whole network is also a CA and may express trust in
a certificate of another participant. Each participant keeps a
list of other participants of the system that are trusted and
another list of participants that are trusted to express trust in
other participants. As with the PKI, establishing trust in an
unknown participant requires to build a trust path between the
unknown participant and oneself. However, as no hierarchy
exists, finding such a path is a hard task. Another approach to
trust establishment are reputation models. No certificates are
issued but the behavior of participants is monitored and trust
values are assigned based on different attributes like former or
expected behavior. Participants may exchange trust values of
each other.
Hybrid: A hybrid trust model is one that makes use for
example of a distributed PKI, which assigns identities to
participants, mainly for liability reasons. This trust path is only
used in case of an accident or when certain conditions are met.
But the operational trust between participants is realized via
a reputation system and only if enough evidence of bad or
malicious behavior was recorded, the PKI infrastructure would
step in to permanently revoke or destroy the cryptographic
material of the offending node. Hybrid solutions are trying
to combine both central and decentral approaches, to get the
benefits of both approaches, like somewhat independence of
central infrastructure or better privacy features.
A. Impersonation
Defending against replay or whole message spoofing at-
tacks is usually done at a protocol level. If used communication
TABLE I. ANALYSIS OVERVIEW
Security Issues Centralized Decentralized Hybrid Ref.
Impersonation [12],[5],[13] [14],[15] [16] II-A
Data Tampering [17],[12],[10] [14] [18] II-B
Routing Attacks [19],[20],[21] [22],[23] [13] II-C
Sybil Attacks [24] [25],[26] [27] II-D
Eclipse Attacks [28] [25] - II-E
Wormhole Attacks - [29],[19] - II-F
Denial of Service [13] [30] - II-G
Privacy Violation [12],[31],[16],[28],[32] [17] [33],[34] II-H
protocols do not defend against those attacks a communication
system, regardless its architecture will be hard to secure.
Communication systems usually use some kind of identities
to distinguish between different participants. Those identities
usually need to be protected against impersonation to sustain
distinguishability.
Centralized: In case strong identities are needed like in
a system utilizing identity based cryptography [35] Sun et al.
[12] propose storing identities in a tamper proof hardware to
prevent identity theft. So do Hubaux et al. [5] they store their
form of identity, called electronic license plate, in an event
date recorder (EDR), similar to a black box in an aircraft. The
EDR in return itself should be “protected [...] physically”[5].
Similarly Raya et al. [13] are using a “trusted component” in
their protocols to store and protect identity data against theft.
Decentralized: Every participant in a VANET should have
its own model of its vicinity and validate every piece of
data received, according to Golle et al. [14]. They authen-
ticated communication via public/private key pairs but they
are self generated by each node and should be refreshed
constantly [14]. Additionally, they propose using “location-
limited channels”[15] to distinguish nodes. As an example of
a “location-limited channel”[15] is the use of infrared signaling
given by Golle et al. [14].
Hybrid: In an approach called “Efficient Decentralized
Revocation Protocol”[16] (EDR) Wasef et al. propose a way
to revoke trust in identities based on “probabilistic random
key distribution technique and a novel pairing-based threshold
scheme”[16]. It uses PKI but the revocation process is decen-
tralized and facilitated by voting.
B. Data Tampering
Depending on how nodes are communicating in a VANET,
whether it is single hop or multi hop communication, different
opportunities arise for data tampering or manipulation. If
transmitted data is not integrity protected, any intermediate
system or bystander could change the information for its own
benefit.
Centralized: One of the more complete approaches was
proposed by Li et al. [17]. They based their scheme also on
identity based cryptography [35]. But they extended it with
blind signatures and one-way hash chains to provide mutual
authentication, confidentiality and integrity, while preserving
privacy. This approach is similar to that of Sun et al. [12],
which also is based on identity cryptography and aims to
deliver on the same security requirements [10].
Decentralized: Using a reputation system in conjunction
with collecting and querying for additional data, to verify and
attest trustworthiness of information is proposed by Golle et
al. [14]. Every node builds up his own model of the network
around him and validates data against it.
Hybrid: In [18], Zhang et al. present a scheme called
“RAISE” a Roadside Unit(RSU)-adied message authentication
scheme, which uses keyed-hash message authentication where
the secret key is known by the RSU, which in return can
therefore attest that the message is authentic. The proposed
scheme is compatible with traditional PKI-based systems,
further more it makes use of PKI as a fallback mechanism.
C. Routing Attacks
To prevent congestion in ad-hoc wireless environments
nodes are listening to its neighbors and if a neighbor is better
suited to forward messages it stops rebroadcasting messages. If
an attacker could convince a node that he is better positioned,
the attacker can silence other nodes. Which would make them
effectively disappear from the VANET, so called silencing
attacks. Also a vehicular ad-hoc network where bandwidth is
limited, and far reaching connections to central systems needed
to be routed through long range wireless communication tech-
nology like LTE or UMTS. Those communication technologies
are expensive to use compared to a node posing as a high
speed uplink or gateway reachable via ad-hoc communication,
called sinkholing attack. This enables MitM attacks, where
a malicious gateway can intercept or even alter the sent and
received messages.
Centralized: One of the first secure routing protocols for
VANETs were proposed by Eichler et al. [19] called AODV-
SEC based on “Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector” (AODV).
Lu et al. designed the “social-based privacy-preserving packet
forwarding” [20] (SPRING) to be resistant against black holing
attacks by utilizing road side infrastructure. Relying on PKI for
strong identities but giving incentives, based on game theory, to
nodes taking part in a mobile ad-hoc network, was proposed by
Zhong et al. [21]. Sprite, “a simple, cheat-proof, credit-based
system for mobile ad-hoc networks” [21] also needs a central
Credit Clearance Service (CCS) to function.
Decentralized: In [22], Huang et al. propose a cluster
based intrusion detection system to detect various attacks,
among them sinkholing or blackholing. Their approach is
focused on detection of those attacks and mitigation is left
for the network to handle. The CONFIDANT protocol by
Buchegger et al. [23] consist out of four entities present in each
node: Monitor, Reputation System, Path Manager and Trust
Manager. The Trust Manager collects events via the Monitor
and uses the Reputation System to evaluate the events and the
result of the evaluation are used by the Path Manager to adjust
the rounting, to mitigate attacks like sinkholing.
Hybrid: To detect and respectively mitigate misbehaving
nodes Raya et al. [13] propose two methods “Misbehavior
Detection System (MDS)” and “Local Eviction of Attackers by
Voting Evaluators (LEAVE)”. When detecting a misbehaving
node, LEAVE is used to degrade the attackers trust until a
central certificate authority revokes its certificates. LEAVE is
resilient to interference as long as colluding attackers are a
minority.
D. Sybil Attacks
When protocols with voting procedures are used or if some
kind of collaboration between nodes for making collective
group decisions is needed, then a so called sybil attack could
be used to influence protocols or decisions. This is done by
creating sock puppets that the attacker controls to act on behave
of him. In an vehicular environment, if an attacker would
like to push the envelope, he and his sock puppets could
simulate braking or congestion, and then tricking the victims
into believing him. Protocols like the previously mentioned
LEAVE Protocol by Raya et al. [13] have a certain threshold
to, which they are resilient against a sybil attack. The important
factor is the size of the sock puppet group in comparison to
the amount of honest nodes.
Centralized: An easy protection against sybil attacks is
the use of centrally enforced and distributed strong identities.
Identities are created by a central authority and handed down
to the nodes prior to their deployment as stated by Piro et
al. [24]. This process could be upfront or part of a VANET
joining protocol. Either way a central entity knows to whom
it has handed a specific identity. With autonomous vehicles
at the horizon it may be even more compelling or tempting
to use the vehicle identification number as such an id. This
approach has many privacy implications, like unique traceable
identities, or the central data storage would be a high value
target for theft or intrusion.
Decentralized: In [25], Xiao et al. draft a technique
called “Basic Signal-Strength-Based Position Verification”
[25], which is used to verify the position by a claimer based on
the signal strength. This technique is then used after collecting
beacon messages to decide based on probability if there is a
sybil node nearby and if so a statistic model is used to attribute
the sybil nodes to one originating vehicle. Park et al. are using
a timestamp based approach to detect sybil attackers [26].
Hybrid: An approach using timestamp series and RSUs
issuing certificates was proposed by Park et al. [27]. The
RSUs themselves have public private key pairs and a certificate
from a central certificate authority. All vehicles must have the
public key of the certificate authority pre-installed. Additional
vehicles generate their own pair of keys. Similar timestamps
series are identified as a sybil attack. To protect against sybil
attack each data message must contain current timestamp
certificate, RSU certificate, signed data and of course the
data itself. If any inconsistencies occur the packets should
be dropped. As the authors suggested by themselves [27] this
approach is not suited for high traffic and urban scenarios, due
to the spatial and temporal difference assumption falling apart.
E. Eclipse Attacks
An eclipse attack utilizes compromised neighbors to influ-
ence group decisions. It is also useful when the separation of
nodes from other nodes weakens the whole network segment,
by degrading the trust in the honest group while improving its
own standing in the network. This approach usually eases and
strengthens other attacks like DoS II-G.
Centralized: Quick and efficient removal of identified
malicious nodes is key in protecting against eclipse attacks.
Therefore Wasef et al. [28] proposed, based on a PKI system,
not only a novel message authentication approach but also a
quick certificate revocations approach to evict the trustworthi-
ness of misbehaving nodes.
Decentralized: Some of the methods used to defend
against sybil attacks also could be used to defend against
eclipse attacks especially Xiao et al. [25] are trying to suppress
sybil attacks in conjunction with opposite traffic flow and their
ability to proof that they came from an upstream source.
Hybrid: - No hybrid approaches were found in literature.
F. Wormhole Attacks
When an attacker can control two nodes in different
VANET segments and has a high speed link between those two,
he can mount a so called wormhole attack. Illegal but correct
traffic would originate from and to both ends of the tunnel,
making vehicles suddenly appear in each others vicinity, while
actually being in two remote locations. This type of attack
could be the basis for executing other attacks, like sybil II-D,
eclipse II-E or denial of service II-G attacks. A wormhole
might be used by an attacker, to generate illegal traffic and let
the nodes interfere with each trustworthiness in the connected
segments, influence voting procedures or even cause a denial
of service when the nodes in both segments revoke each others
trustworthiness based on wrong positioning information.
Centralized: Assuming global network visibility is
achieved, illegal traffic, which would be generated by a worm-
hole attack could be spotted by roadside units, acting as a
sensor. The central network management system should then
be able to correlate that the same traffic is visible in two remote
locations. Mitigation of such an attack would only be a notice
to affected nodes to discard traffic that is not in their vicinity.
Most stronger responses like revoking the right to allocate a
channel for communication would not harm the attacker in
between but the nodes in their respective network segment.
This could result in a DoS attack.
Decentralized: In [29], Safi et al. based their effort, like
Eichler et al. [19], on the AODV Routing Protocol and en-
hanced it to include “geographical leashes” that should prevent
the forwarding of packets from different geographic areas with
additional packet authentication.
Hybrid: - No hybrid approaches were found in literature.
G. Denial of Service
Denial of service attacks are often used as distraction or
an accompanying attack that should weaken the position of a
system to ease the real attack or exploit. This type of issue is
one of the harder ones to defend against. Because there are
no purely technical means to defend against jamming attacks
in wireless communication systems. Types of denial of service
attacks include jamming of radio frequencies, traffic flooding
or silver bullet attacks, where one specially crafted packet may
be able to disrupt service.
Centralized: When a system needs a functioning PKI, like
most of the mentioned approaches, or the one from Raya et
al. [13]. A DoS attack could me mounted by creating a lot of
identities and then report those same identities as malicious
or fraudulent. This could result in a flood of certificate revo-
cations, which could lead to DoS when revocation lists get
to big or the revocation operation is computational intensive.
To mitigate this threat Raya et al. [13] suggested the use
of “Compressed Certificate Revocation Lists (RC2RL)” and
“Revocation of the Trusted Component (RTC)” protocols.
Decentralized: For VANETs Hamieh et al. [30] described
a method to detect on going jamming attacks. They focused on
attacks where the jammer is only sending when his hardware is
allowed to, he abides the rules of the underlying IEEE 802.11p
Standard. Their model is based on time correlation of errors
and correct receptions to detect the presence of a jamming
attack.
Hybrid: - No hybrid approaches were found in literature.
H. Privacy Violation
In a cooperative system where every neighboring node
should have all the needed information to make intelligent
decisions on its own and for the group, it is clear that all this
information needs to be communicated. Therefore, when every
node broadcasts his position, trajectory, acceleration, route or
other data, basically a profile of the driver could be created. If
this data is readable by everybody in the vicinity, somebody
just needs to set up an antenna and can now make statistics
where and when people are driving, when traveling past him.
Centralized: To protect privacy and making tracking
harder most approaches use pseudonyms and rotating them,
like [12], [31]. But everybody does it slightly different, Sun
et al. [12] are using “preloading [...] pseudonym(s)” whereas
Choi et al. [31] use generation of public keys by deriving it
from the secret id only known to an authority and the vehicle
itself. While still allowing the verification and certification
based on time stamps and other public key parameters. But
almost all approaches [16], [28], [32], found during our survey
are using PKI to guarantee authenticity and non-repudiation.
The latter one supposedly for liability reasons.
Decentralized: To preserve privacy Li et al. [17] presented
a scheme called “SECSPP” utilizing non interactive identity
based cryptography and a blind signature scheme for allowing
anonymous usage of RSU services. Anonymous confidential
communication between the RSU and vehicles make tracking
or eavesdropping harder and more expensive.
Hybrid: A cluster based architecture utilizing PKI, thesh-
old cryptography and location limited side channel [15], like
license plate recognition is proposed by Bechler et al. [33]
to secure ad-hoc communication, similar to an approach by
Zhou et al. [34]. To adapt to different security levels the
approach by Bechler et al. [33] supports 4 different modes
of operation: no encryption, cluster key encryption, public key
directly exchanged and public key certified by a distributed
certificate authority, in this case the cluster heads.
III. CONCLUSION
Some security issues in ITSs are hard or outright impos-
sible to mitigate on a purely technical basis, this is why we
did not consider them in our review. Examples for this type
of attacks are, jamming or physical tampering. An attacker
with a radio frequency jammer can suppress any meaningful
communication [5]. Often the solution to physical tampering
is to even better tamper proof those devices, like sensors
or Electronic Control Units (ECUs). This climaxes often in
the inclusion of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), which
shifts the responsibility and trust to the manufactures of those
components. But as explained in the introduction I, trust in
those supposedly highly secure entities has been shattered
in the recent years. Therefore relying on them can be the
Achilles heal of a system. Besides those doubts there are many
solutions for centralized architectures and some decentralized
ones. We were able to find suitable hybrid solutions in the
literature for only five out of eight security issues. Often only
one hybrid solution could be found for a specific security
issue. Our findings are summarized in the Table I. We there-
fore conclude that hybrid approaches are underrepresented in
current research, which might be an indicator that further
research is needed or that hybrid approaches appear to be
fruitless endeavors. To answer those questions further research,
including a comparative study, needs to be conducted. The
direction the standardization efforts, by IEEE and ETSI, are
heading, is towards centralized architectures with all benefits
and weaknesses. Those will set the mark against all other
solutions have to prove themselves. Eventually decentralized
solutions could be considered for integration in those standards
if proven beneficial.
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